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ABSTRACT
The rise of social media means that data about a large number of people is available in public and
quasi-public digital locations. Employers, keen on taking advantage of this additional data to
decrease the risk associated with an offer of employment, are engaging in “cyber-vetting”—nonconsenting social media searches conducted by third parties or the employers themselves. To the
extent that current law applies to this practice, the regulation it provides is weak and attacks only
part of the problem. Left unchecked, cyber-vetting has the potential to fundamentally alter the
scope of prospective employees’ rights. This article surveys the legal and practical implications of
cyber-vetting and suggests broad reforms focused on intelligently balancing individual rights and
legitimate employer interests.
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THE EMERGING REALITY OF SOCIAL MEDIA: EROSION OF INDIVIDUAL
PRIVACY THROUGH CYBER-VETTING AND LAW’S INABILITY TO CATCH UP
DR. SABY GHOSHRAY*
INTRODUCTION
One of the significant technological advancements of contemporary society
manifests itself in the access, ease and speed of communication in cyberspace. 1 The
development of this game-changing technology allowed economies of scale to shape
pricing in favor of widespread use of search engines and social networking sites,
unleashing a pervasive digital immersion within society. As public agencies and
governmental entities continue to make public records available online,2 individual
exuberance in social media has generated a culture of rampant sharing of private
affairs with strangers on the Internet.3 Against this dynamic backdrop, this article
examines the danger to individual privacy emanating from the emerging practice of
employment screening based on an individual’s online activities. As instantaneous
* © Dr. Saby Ghoshray 2013.
Dr. Saby Ghoshray’s scholarship focuses on subsets of
International Law, Constitutional Law, Cyberspace Law, Technology & Fourth Amendment, among
others. His work has appeared in a number of publications including Albany Law Review, ILSA
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Review, Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, Temple Political & Civil Rights Law
Review, Fordham International Law Journal, Santa Clara Law Review, Michigan State
International Law Journal, Loyola Law Journal and Washburn Law Journal, among others. The
author would like to thank Jennifer Schulke for her assistance in legal research and typing of the
manuscript. Much love to his beautiful children, Shreyoshi and Sayantan, for their patience and
understanding. I offer much appreciation to the members of the John Marshall Review of
Intellectual Property Law for their dedication in the edit process. Dr. Ghoshray can be reached at
sabyghoshray@sbcglobal.net.
1 See Net Impact: US Becomes a Facebook Nation, BUS. NEWS DAILY (Apr. 6, 2011, 4:20 PM),
http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/840-facebook-smartphone-majority-americans-online-.html
(describing the multitude of ways Americans use technology in their everyday lives).
2 Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86
MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2002).
3 See Kieron O’Hara et al., Lifelogging: Privacy and Empowerment with Memories for Life, 1
IDENTITY IN INFO. SOC’Y 155, 157 (2008), available at http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%
2Fs12394-009-0008-4.pdf. Technological advancement has allowed rapid enhancement in the
functional aspects of information acquisition, sensor capacity, data streaming, and data storage and
retrieval in the digital environment. Id. at 156. Mediated through the use of HDTV, smartphones,
the Internet, and other devices, technology has allowed pervasive use and acclimatization of digital
communication, empowering individuals to disseminate an unedited and non-discriminatory
collection of personal information in cyberspace. This allows entities outside of the original intended
recipient to access and investigate an abundance of personal information by following the digital
trails of a person’s online exchanges, enabling various entities to reconstruct a new locus of online
identity. Id. at 156–58. Digital footprint refers to this locus of online identity an individual leaves
behind in cyberspace crated through that individual’s online interactions that ranges from shopping,
email communication, cyberspace chat, social media interaction, sharing YouTube videos, etc. Id. at
156, 165 (observing the various modes and modicums of individual exchanges in cyberspace that
enables the development of an emerging culture of online social presence where individuals shed
personal privacy in documenting their lives in front of strangers).
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access to information seeks to fundamentally alter society’s behavioral norms,
employment screening has almost become an organic extension of traditional
background checks.4 Yet, employment law has failed to adequately address privacy
concerns in this context.5
The Internet offers an efficient method by which to obtain background
information about prospective employees.6 Because viewing an individual’s social
media activities may enable a potential employer to gain valuable insight into the
applicant’s behavioral profile, cyber-vetting has become the norm as opposed to an
exception.7 Cyber-vetting, however, is fundamentally different from the traditional
employment screening in more significant ways than are currently acknowledged.8
What is the objective of employment screening? Whether performed via the
traditional background check, or through the emerging practice of cyber-vetting, the
objective of applicant screening is to analyze the submitted individual’s profile for
suitability with the hiring entity’s corporate culture.9
Widespread access to
individuals’ online activities has changed the employment screening landscape, as
the search for the right candidate for a position based on expertise and qualifications
has transmogrified into an exercise in seeking a desired behavioral profile. This
development has created a much wider scope for discrimination based on behavioral
norms.
4 See Rosemary Haefner, More Employers Screening Candidates via Social Networking Sites,
CAREERBUILDER.COM, http://www.careerbuilder.com/Article/CB-1337-Getting-Hired-More-Employe
rs-Screening-Candidates-via-Social-Networking-Sites/?ArticleID=1337 (last updated June 10, 2009,
4:20 PM) (finding that forty-five percent of employers admitted to using social media to pre-screen
job applicants).
5 See DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE 71, 75 (2004), available at http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/dsolove/Digital-Person/text/DigitalPerson-CH4.pdf (presenting a number of privacy issues that need to be addressed by employment
law with the advent of social media).
6 See Victoria R. Brown & E. Daly Vaughn, The Writing on the (Facebook) Wall: The Use of
Social Networking Sites in Hiring Decisions, 26 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 219, 219 (2011),
http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs10869-011-9221-x (listing Facebook, LinkedIn,
MySpace, and Twitter as popular platforms for employee background checks). Potential employers
have dismissed employees based on information obtained via their social media content, revealing
details that included, among others, provocative or inappropriate photographs or information,
images showing drug or alcohol related activities, negative comments about prior employment, and
discriminatory comments, which are all areas that can be covered within broader speech protection
rights, unless prohibited by contractual obligations. See, e.g., P. Haans Mulder & Nicholas R.
Dekker, Social Networking: Your Business Clients and Their Employees are Doing It, MICH. BUS.
L.J., Summer 2010, at 44, 45, available at www.michbar.org/business/BLJ/Summer%202010/mulder
_dekker.pdf.
7 See ANDRÉE ROSE ET AL., INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, DEVELOPING A CYBERVETTING
STRATEGY FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 (2010), available at http://www.iacpsocialmedia.org/Portals/
1/documents/CybervettingReport.pdf (“Cybervetting is an assessment of a person’s suitability to
hold a position using information found on the Internet to help make that determination.”).
8 See Brenda Berkelaar, Cyber-Vetting (Potential) Employees: An Emerging Area of Study for
Organizational Communication, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International
Communication Association, Montreal, Canada 5 (May 22, 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://dpclo.defense.gov/civil/docs/ArticleCybervettingPotentialEmployees.pdf.
9 Robert Sprague, Rethinking Information Privacy in an Age of Online Transparency, 25
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 395, 397–98 (2008).

[12:551 2013] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

554

The emerging online-based employment screening differs significantly from its
traditional counterpart. The traditional employment screening typically focuses on
criminal records, financial credit scores, civil judgments against the candidate, and
other process driven outcomes of deterministic events, mostly generated through
judicial proceedings and consent-driven disclosures.10 On the other hand, personal
behavior based information collected on the Internet is predominantly an exercise in
seeking individuals’ digital footprints.11 As detailed below, such a screening often
times relies on imprecise, incomplete, and static data. On the other hand, records
reviewed for traditional employment screens are typically based on deterministic
outcomes of individual actions.12 Both the results and the procedures to arrive at
such outcomes can be challenged by the affected individual within a due process
framework.13 Individual records generated based on reviewing online activities and
profiles result from non-deterministic events, which the affected individual may not
get the opportunity to dispute or challenge. Thus, cyber-vetting may result in
erroneous inferences based on generating informational vignettes lacking a
deterministic element or a source with any possessory connection. Let us examine
the following three illustrative scenarios.
Scenario 1: It is the morning after Super Bowl 2013 and Jack is hung over.
He has photos to upload to his public website, lots of photos which highlight
Jack’s night of partying with whisky, wine, and women. A weekend later,
Jack finds himself uploading more photos showcasing his “drink of choice.”
He is quick to tag photos on his Facebook account. Over the next sixmonths, this routine is repeated numerous times. Jack’s Facebook account
reflects a guy who has lots of friends, enjoys socializing with whisky, and is
always surrounded by many party girls. His Facebook page is full of tagged
photos of his 115 friends, and his page includes a link to a famous bourbon
company’s Facebook page. Jack has no criminal record whatsoever and
never drinks during the week. He simply likes to party on weekends. Jack
is also in full-time pursuit of a new position. He is a well-qualified
accountant with a Master’s degree and a CPA license. He has worked at
the same firm for three years, but is looking to relocate. At his last
interview, he had impressed the team of first level interviewers and was
called back for a second round of interviews by the senior executives. Jack
was feeling confident. However, Jack was shocked to be informed by
Human Resources (“HR”) that the company was no longer interested. Jack
thinks that his photo collage on his Facebook page may have influenced the
HR Department’s decision not to pursue him. Could this be true?

10 See Elizabeth D. De Armond, To Cloak the Within: Protecting Employees from Personality
Testing, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 1129, 1134–36 (2012).
11 See Sprague, supra note 9, at 399.
12 See De Armond, supra note 10, at 1134–35.
13 Employment
Background
Checks,
FED.
TRADE
COMMISSION
(Feb.
2013),
http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0157-employment-background-checks.
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Scenario 2: Jill was a front line analyst at an investment bank, but was
laid off over a year ago when the economy went into decline. She has
incredible talent, excellent references, and even received an additional
certificate in project management while laid off. Nonetheless, she has not
gotten any interview call backs. To earn a little money while unemployed,
Jill has taken some glamour shots and posted them on her Facebook
website. It has been her hope to break into modeling. Her glamour shots
are not nude, but revealing. Some of her shots include poses on motorcycles
and cars, in various outfits, and also with other models. Jill’s Facebook page
also describes her volunteerism, travels, and poetry. But Jill still thinks
that every time she submits her resume, the company is first looking at her
Facebook page and not calling her in for an interview. Could she be right?
Scenario 3: Eric is a mid-level executive at a Big Four firm. He uses social
media very sparingly. He does not have a fan following. He does not have a
Facebook page, and he does not tweet. For all practical purposes, he is
virtually non-existent in the social media world. A couple of years earlier,
Eric attended a controversial court proceeding in his hometown. He had no
connection to the case whatsoever, other than mere curiosity, as the case
received nationwide coverage. Eric attended only a few hour-long sessions
of the case and, upon leaving the courtroom was stopped by a local
television journalist and asked a few questions. He did not say anything
extreme, but he did speak about his contrarian view of the case. Little did
Eric know that his two minute interview would go viral, as his comments
made nationwide news. His controversial views upset a lot of people, and
the two-minute interview was uploaded to numerous websites, which played
and replayed on popular news channels. Eric even received multiple
requests to appear on television about his comments. He declined them all.
Now, every time Eric types his own name in any search engine, the viral
video always comes up first. The results always appear negative because of
the viral video. Yet, Eric is an excellent employee and a devoted father of
three, yet, he has not been given a raise in the last several years, whereas
other, less qualified, employees are being promoted. He believes the HR
department has done a search on him, and that the viral video is hurting
his chances for promotion. Could he be right?
Of course, the above scenarios are merely hypothetical. Yet, they represent
prototypical employment decisions unfolding in contemporary employment practices.
At the core, the scenarios represent how the societal landscape is being shaped by
individuals’ immersion in social media. More importantly, they prompt us to reflect
on how technology has changed our lives. Because contemporary individuals conduct
aspects of their lives through electronic means, important decisions on their careers
could be made based on a search of their digital footprints.14 This dystopian reality is
14 Michael Jones et al., The Ethics of Pre-Employment Screening Through the Use of the
Internet, in THE ETHICAL IMPERATIVE IN THE CONTEXT OF EVOLVING TECHNOLOGIES 43 (Dan
McIntosh et. al., eds., 2004).
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a stark reminder of the uncertainties currently percolating through the employeeemployer relationship. As this Pandora’s box of legal indeterminacy opens up into
corporate conference rooms, it has the potential to trickle into the Nation’s
courtrooms and administrative tribunals. Unless emerging employment law takes
due cognizance of individuals’ privacy rights by restraining employers’ unbridled
search of their online activities, judges and administrators will be thrust into the
unenviable role of making significant decisions regarding people’s lives and
livelihoods, with only scarce legislative guidance.
As noted above, cyber-vetting is the search and examination of potential
employees’ digital footprints.15 By uncovering information that is not readily
available from the submitted application, an online search of a candidate’s profile
helps employers narrow their lists of candidates.16 On the surface, however, cybervetting is premised on conducting legitimate due diligence in furtherance of a
legitimate business interest. Yet, much more is implicated via cyber-vetting—an
aspect that is missing in contemporary discussions. Smartphones, Android,
Facebook, Twitter, and iChat, each represent a dimension through which postmodern individuals communicate. 17 As they live their lives wired, by connecting,
uploading, downloading, and streaming online, not only do these individuals form
communities, but they also exhibit emotions and share private details with their
community members. Along the way, potential employees leave a digital footprint—of
themselves and their friends—all of which is subject to inspection via cyber-vetting.
This disturbing trend toward über-surveillance of potential employees is an
outgrowth of contemporary society’s digital immersion into social media. By giving
up a part of her privacy, through her social media activities, the applicant opens
herself to an all-out investigation of her online persona. The lack of legislative
guidelines compounds the conflict between an individual’s privacy right and an
employer’s legitimate business interests. As enhanced functionalities within
cyberspace have reconfigured the way individuals interact online, and in practically
all aspects of modern life, yet the legal protection for such private communications
has not evolved accordingly.18
The legal issues raised by this phenomenon go beyond an individual’s right to
privacy, viewing information outside of an applicant’s submitted information, which
exposes the employer to privileged information that it has no right to view. When an
employer examines the content of an applicant’s digital life conducted in cyberspace
with her selected “friends,” the employer could be exposed to a range of liabilities.19
These could include having improper awareness of the protected status of an
applicant,20 making negligent and discriminatory hiring decisions based on
See ROSE ET AL., supra note 7, at 1.
See Sprague, supra note 9, at 399.
17 See How Social Media has Changed the Way We Communicate, INFO. GATEWAY (Jan. 24,
2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.informationgateway.org/social-media-changed-communicate/.
18 Alissa Del Riego et al., Your Password or Your Paycheck? A Job Applicant’s Murky Right to
Social Media Privacy, J. INTERNET L., Sept. 2012, 1, 18, 21–22 (“It is no secret that privacy law has
had trouble catching up with modern technology.”).
19 See id. at 18.
20 See, e.g., Gaskell v. Univ. of Ky., No. 09-244-KSF, 2010 WL 4867630, at *1–5 (E.D. Ky. Nov.
23, 2010) (explaining that a potential employee was a great candidate based on his application, but
15
16
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inaccurate or misleading information,21 and intruding on an applicant’s personal
space.22 For these applicants, searching for a job must not mean relinquishing their
fundamental right to protect their online privacy, which includes their protected
status in social media. This article, therefore, intends to trace the locus of this
emerging disconnect between an individual’s fundamental right and an employer’s
current practice against the emerging social media exuberance. It will proceed as
follows.
Part II examines the current landscape of digital immersion in contemporary
society to better understand the background that facilitated the emergence of this
newer social media exuberance. Although the linkages between social media
exuberance and employer surveillance has not been established as a matter of law,
their relationship would be informative to analyze. Part II also analyzes the reasons
and examines societal factors that have given rise to the law’s evolution in this
direction.
Part III examines how current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can be
applicable in identifying how individual behaviors may be framed within the confines
of settled jurisprudence. By analyzing the aspirational dimensions of constitutional
cases to find analogous behavior in the post-modern era, this section develops a
nuanced understanding of the employer’s current penchant for über-surveillance.
Part IV examines individual behavior in social media, which may have a definite
link in abrogating individuals’ subjective expectation of privacy. By developing a set
of fundamentals, this section drives home the point that the contemporary society’s
digital immersion is a natural outgrowth of human evolution. Yet, technology-fuelled
surveillance of ordinary citizens must not be allowed to implicate fundamental
liberties of individuals. The discussion above leads to a development in Part V,
outlining the allowable trajectory of online searches for cyber-vetting of potential
applicants.
Finally, Part VI concludes that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence may still be
robust enough to address complexities arising out of social media behavior and its
implications in applicant-employer relationships.
I. SETTING THE LANDSCAPE OF APPLICANT—EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
Combining efficiency in data mining algorithms with enhancement in
computational speed and storage capability, data analytics can extract behavioral
patterns from conglomeration of personal information. 23 Fast transitioning from an
emerging phenomenon to a conventional practice, the combination of data
was not hired after an Internet search was conducted, which revealed the candidate’s religious
preferences).
21 See Laurie Ruettimann, Don’t Facebook Me:
Why You Shouldn’t Google During the
Recruiting Process, TLNT (Oct. 4, 2010, 8:07 AM), http://www.tlnt.com/2010/10/04/dont-facebook-mewhy-you-shouldnt-google-during-the-recruiting-process/.
22 See Del Riego et al., supra note 18, at 18.
23 Tal Z. Zarsky, Government Data Mining and its Alternatives, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 285, 287
(2011) (stating that data mining may not only be successful in the commercial realm, but also for
governmental actions).
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aggregation and personal profile searches has come to be known as “big data.”24 In
the absence of mature privacy laws, operating outside the ethical bounds of society,
big data has given rise to a digital war against privacy. 25 Emboldened by its ease of
access and cost advantage, corporate entities utilize big data to access private
information on individuals. Their social media exuberance, often times unbeknownst
to them, compels individuals to leave behind personal details via digital exchanges in
cyberspace.26 Big data is more than happy to collect and process such information,
enabling corporations and government agencies to utilize them for behavioral
prediction modeling.27 Cyber-vetting of a potential employee must be seen through
this emerging reality.
Having everyone’s privacy at the click of a mouse allows a potential employer to
conduct pre-employment screening of individuals by reviewing minute details of their
private affairs. We must prompt ourselves to explore the fundamental question: Just
how little are we prepared to value our individual privacy? At its root, big datadriven exploration into an individual’s zone of private seclusion is really an intrusion
into the individual’s personal space—a classic search and seizure without any
warrant or probable cause.28 If more employers utilize data mining and social media
searches to screen potential employees, intrusion into individual’s private personal
space will become a conventional practice in society. Must a civilized society allow
this?
Privacy is a fundamental liberty component.29 For each unique individual,
conceptualization of privacy varies for different stages of life and society. Yet, every
individual has an inherent right to be left alone within her personal confines.30 Thus,
there is a fundamental distinction between employee surveillance within the work
place and violating an applicant’s privacy during pre-employment screening.31 Given
Big Data—What Is It?, SAS, http://www.sas.com/big-data/ (last visited May 21, 2013).
See Joseph S. Fulda, Data Mining and Privacy, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 105, 106 (2000)
(questioning whether data mining is a violation of privacy that should be limited by law).
26 See John Soma, Melodi Mosley Gates & Michael Smith, Bit-Wise But Privacy Foolish:
Smarter E-Messaging Technologies Call for a Return to Core Privacy Principles, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 487, 504–05 (2010).
27 See Zarsky, supra note 23, at 287 (indicating that data mining is vastly becoming a tool that
government agencies use on individuals, which poses risks to security).
28 See Wayne N. Renke, Who Controls the Past Now Controls the Future: Counter-Terrorism,
Data Mining and Privacy, 43 ALBERTA L. REV. 779, 789, 812 (2006) (explaining specifically that data
mining is highly intrusive in relation to personal information).
29 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214–
15 (1890) (discussing the need for privacy as technology developed in 1890). The sanctity of privacy
as a fundamental right has illuminated the U.S. Constitution for more than a century. Id. at 193–
95. The core privacy fundamental had emerged from a much deeper right-to-life interpretation with
its roots embedded in the conception of liberty. Id. at 193–94. Therefore, individual privacy is
recognized as an essential component of liberty. Id. at 193–94. Long before the technological
onslaught of the post-modern era, Justice Warren and Justice Brandeis invoked a deeper
fundamental right to privacy that has since been muted somewhat under the attack of states’
heightened interests. See id. at 193.
30 See id. at 195.
31 Jon Vegosan, Employee Monitoring and Pre-employment Screening, RISK MGMT. MAG. (Oct.
1, 2010, 3:40 PM), http://www.rmmagazine.com/2010/10/01/employee-monitoring-and-pre-employ
ment-screening (describing the distinction between employee monitoring and pre-employment
screening, including the obligations and consequences of each).
24
25
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how her deliberate immersion into online activities may have shaped her subjective
expectation of privacy, the thresholds of privacy may vary amongst individuals. 32
This may prompt an employer to conduct limited surveillance at the workplace
within allowable limits.33 Such right to surveillance, however, cannot extend to an
individual’s private affairs during employment screening. Recognition of this
distinction will do much to protect employers from liability for privacy violations.
Often times, an employer might be tempted to extend its surveillance
mechanism for conducting a background search of a potential employee. Such
surveillance should be recognized as falling outside the bounds of legal limits, as an
employer may not intrude into the private affairs of a common citizen. This is
particularly important because social media based networking sites have ushered in
a new era of accessibility for private information. As more individuals immerse
themselves in extensive online communications, they leave behind their digital
footprints.34 Although an individual’s online behavior may signal changes in
contemporary society’s subjective expectation of privacy at the workplace, it certainly
does not change the fundamental contours of the individual right to privacy.35
Therefore, before engaging in a full-scale online search of a prospective employee, an
employer must review its search criteria to ensure the privacy of that individual is
not jeopardized.36
Search of a candidate’s digital footprint is a valuable tool for employment
screening.37 Yet, an unbounded search of such a footprint may constitute an
intrusion into an individual’s privacy. 38 Thus, the scope of such a search must be
carefully limited to insulate the employer from compliance violations, as legal risks
could arise in multiple dimensions—from violation of consent requirements for third
party screeners39 to violation of online privacy.40 Because the Internet is saturated
with imprecise information and incomplete personal data, online background

32 See Alexander Naito, A Fourth Amendment Status Update: Applying Constitutional Privacy
Protection to Employees’ Social Media Use, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 849, 876 (2012).
33 See infra Part V. But see Naito, supra note 32, at 863–64.
34 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
35 See Naito, supra note 32, at 881–82.
36 See infra Part IV; Naito, supra note 32, at 865 (explaining that a Fourth Amendment
analysis into an employee’s privacy should “involve a balance of the employer’s interests and an
evaluation as to the method by which the employer obtains the information”).
37 Naito, supra note 32, at 863–64.
38 See Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords: 2012 Legislation, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/employeraccess-to-social-media-passwords.aspx (summarizing amended legislation from fourteen states that
would restrict employers from requesting access to social networking usernames and passwords of
applicants, students, or employees due to an invasion of privacy).
39 See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012) (subjecting anyone who intentionally accesses without
authorization or exceeds an authorization to access the contents of electronic communication to
punishments listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2701(b)).
40 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)–(2) (“[A] person or entity providing an electronic communication
service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a
communication while in electronic storage by that service” or “the contents of any communication
which is carried or maintained on that service.”).

[12:551 2013] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

560

searches often provide the basis for erroneous inferences,41 acting on which may
expose an employer to potential liability for breach of anti-discrimination laws.42
Often times, individuals vent their frustrations or indulge in disparaging
remarks during exchanges with members of their selected online communities.43
This may result in prejudicial information getting stored online, especially within the
pages of social media sites. Thus, social media driven pre-employment screening
may result in the generation of an incomplete or faulty applicant profile.44 This
would certainly make employment decisions based on social media data prone to
judgmental error and may lead to legal liability. Therefore, data collection for
employment screening has several drawbacks. Besides the danger of being
prejudicial and incomplete, data derived from online communication, often times,
lack the proper context as the full exchange may not be readily available.45 This data
is qualitatively different from deterministic personal data obtained from criminal
records or transactional databases like credit reports. Simply put, this data may not
have originated through a verifiable dispute resolution mechanism. 46 Moreover,
conducting background searches based on criminal registry or credit reports may
have different consent requirements than social media based behavioral profile
searches.47
41 Dave Marcus & Patricia Kitchen, Employers Scour Web for Details on Applicants, NEWSDAY
(July 23, 2010, 11:28 AM), http://www.newsday.com/classifieds/jobs/employers-scour-web-for-detailson-applicants-1.2133284 (discussing how employers would generate erroneous inferences from
online background searches).
42 See Sprague, supra note 9, at 416 (emphasizing that online background searches of potential
employees may violate states’ antidiscrimination prohibitions).
43 See, e.g., Facebook Post Gets Worker Fired, ESPN NFL (Mar. 9, 2009, 5:41 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3965039 (“A Facebook post criticizing his employer, the
Philadelphia Eagles, cost a stadium operations worker his job . . . . According to the newspaper,
Leone posted the following on his Facebook page: ‘Dan is [expletive] devastated about Dawkins
signing with Denver . . . Dam Eagles R Retarted [sic]!!’”); David Kravets, AP Reporter Reprimanded
for Facebook Posts; Union Protests, WIRED (June 9, 2009, 4:40 PM), http://www.wired.com/
threatlevel/2009/06/facebooksword (discussing how an Associated Press reporter’s reprimand over a
comment on his Facebook page sparked a demand that the Associated Press clarify its ethics
guidelines).
44 See Marcus & Kitchen, supra note 41.
45 Sprague, supra note 9, at 397 n.19.
46 See infra Part IV.
47 See, for example, The Fair Credit Reporting Act (‘FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012),
which imposes certain consent requirements on “consumer reporting agencies,” a term which the Act
defines broadly. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (“The term ‘consumer reporting agency’ means any person
which . . . regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer
credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports
to third parties . . . .”); 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b) (requiring consumer reporting agencies to obtain from
the employers to whom they furnish reports certifications to the effect that the existence and nature
of the reports have been disclosed to the subject consumers, and that the consumers have authorized
the reports in writing, and requiring that the reports themselves be disclosed to any applicants or
employees against whom the employers take adverse action). The Federal Trade Commission has
stated its position that the FCRA applies to third party social media searches. Letter from
Maneesha Mithal, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Privacy & Identity Prot., Bureau of Consumer Prot., Fed.
Trade Comm’n, to Renee Jackson, Nixon Peabody LLP (May 9, 2011) [hereinafter Mithal Letter],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/110509socialintelligenceletter.pdf. It is unclear what
requirements would apply to a search conducted by the employer itself.
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Thus, the emerging phenomenon of cyber-vetting is the creation of pervasive
digital immersion in contemporary society and social media is shaping the future of
employment relationships. Some reports suggest that as many as eighty percent of
employers use social media to screen applicants.48 Legal risks for employers,
therefore, could escalate in the not too distant future, as the consequences of making
hiring decisions based on information revealed via online searches becomes more
widely understood by the affected individuals. Here, risks could come from obtaining
inaccurate profile information or from becoming privy to privileged information based
on age, gender, sexual orientation, or any other protected status, which may be in
conflict with state and federal laws. 49 Acting upon information gleaned from cached
websites, outdated links, and incomplete vignettes of online activities may bring in
legal liabilities from violating anti-discrimination laws,50 violating third party
consent requirements,51 and not complying with requirements under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (“FCRA”),52 among others.
A. Accurate Information Gathering and Challenges
Identifying an applicant’s behavioral profile from a search of an individual’s
digital footprint is akin to creating a profile via mosaic theory. 53 Mosaic theory is a
practice in which incomplete and partial information vignettes are aggregated
through an intelligent matching process to create a composite profile of an
individual.54 Here, the process is conducive to an outcome wherein no single piece of
information may provide a complete signal about the person. Employers insist on
using a designated third party screening agency to do a background check, either for
ease of processing, or to introduce efficiency in completing the process, or simply due

48 Robert Sprague, Invasion of the Social Networks: Blurring the Line Between Personal Life
and the Employment Relationship, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 4 (2011); see also, e.g., Lora Bentley,
Screening Job Applicants with Social Networks? Establish Procedures First, IT BUS. EDGE (July 10,
2009), http://www.itbusinessedge.com/cm/blogs/bentley/screening-job-applicants-with-social-network
s-establish-procedures-first/?cs=34014 (stating that a city in Montana asks job applicants to disclose
usernames and passwords for their social networking sites to see if applicants were of “solid enough
moral character”). But see Thirty-Seven Percent of Companies Use Social Networks to Research
Potential Job Candidates, According to New CareerBuilder Survey, CAREERBUILDER.COM (Apr. 18,
2012), http://www.careerbuilder.com/share/aboutus/pressreleasesdetail.aspx?id=pr691&sd=4%2F18
%2F2012&ed=4%2F18%2F2099.
49 Scott Brutocao, Issue Spotting: The Multitude of Ways Social Media Impacts Employment
Law and Litigation, THE ADVOC.: LITIG. SEC. ST. B. TEX., Fall 2012, at 8, 8.
50 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
51 Linda D. Schwartz, Social Media—Friend or Foe?, MD. B.J., Mar.–Apr. 2011, at 15–16
(providing examples of improper use of third parties to glean information from social media).
52 See Douglas B. M. Ehlke, The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the Investigation of
Employee Misconduct, FINDLAW (Mar. 26, 2008), http://library.findlaw.com/2004/Feb/1/231211.html;
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)–(B) (2012).
53 See Michael P. Goodwin, A National Security Puzzle: Mosaic Theory and the First
Amendment Right of Access in the Federal Courts, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 179, 180–81
(2010).
54 Id. at 185.
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to a lack of relevant expertise.55 When the screening is performed based on an
analysis and evaluation of social media profiles, the utilized methodology is
fundamentally different than a traditional background check consisting of credit
reports and criminal profiles.56 The reliability and accuracy of the process is suspect
for various reasons: Cyberspace and social networking sites may contain a wide
range of information, digital exchanges, personal musings, and retorts that a
potential screener may take out of context or misunderstand.57
Generally, a third party background screening service assists a potential
employer in navigating the divergent and disparate streams of online information by
developing a composite profile based on social media and networking sites. 58 In
aggregating background information available in profiles on social networking sites
like Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, personal websites, and other online information
sources, the third party aggregator matches scattered and incomplete information to
a specific applicant.59 Online searches are replete with potential errors for
mismatched information.60 For example, some search engines may provide archived
versions of websites, revealing inaccurate, incomplete, or false information for which
the updated version has not been reviewed by a third party background information
provider. Similarly, some search engines may provide mirror websites with archived
and outdated personal information that suffers from lack of temporal
synchronization.61 An employer making employment decisions based on such
information could erroneously draw inferences on the suitability of an applicant,
which may expose the employer to liability for discriminatory employment practices.
Often times, background information obtained from social media sites consists of
incomplete thoughts, innuendos, and imprecise snapshots of an individual’s personal
profile. Thus, information gathered from a social media profile may be neither
55 See, e.g., EMP. SCREENING SERVICES, INC., http://www.employscreen.com/ (last visited May
21, 2013) (providing a third-party screening service to assist employers with the burdens of the
hiring process).
56 Sherry D. Sanders, Privacy is Dead: The Birth of Social Media Background Checks, 39 S.U.
L. REV. 243, 255 (2012) (stating that information from a “social media background check cannot be
verified as easily as information from a basic background check”).
57 See Jones et al., supra note 14, at 3, 5.
58 See, e.g., Jennifer Preston, Social Media History Becomes a New Job Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 2011, at B1 (explaining that Social Intelligence, a third party reporting agency, assembles a
“dossier with examples of professional honors and charitable work, along with negative information
that meets specific criteria” including racist remarks, sexually explicit photos, or displays of
weapons or bombs).
59 See id.
60 See Bentley, supra note 48.
61 See Blumenthal, Franken Call on Social Intelligence Corp to Clarify Privacy Practices,
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, U.S. SENATOR FOR CONN. (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.blumenthal.senate
.gov/newsroom/press/release/blumenthal-franken-call-on-social-intelligence-corp-to-clarify-privacypractice. Senators Richard Blumenthal and Al Franken wrote to Social Intelligence, a company that
provides third-party social media search to employers, pressing the firm on concerns that its
business practices violate individuals’ online privacy and may be unfairly detrimental to their
employment prospects Id. The Senators highlighted the fact that an online search has the potential
to turn up cached pages that house information that has since been updated and questioned the
company as to whether it is able to identify and verify information coming from such a page before
giving that information to an employer. Id.
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correct nor deterministic. This is because that type of derived information is not
based on legal proceedings, like the outcome of a criminal trial, nor from universally
accepted indices, like a credit score provided by an established agency. Social media
captures an individual’s behavioral snapshots in a more informal setting. Such
information may be difficult to verify, challenge, and review.62 As social media
adoption enables employers to change the rules of engagement, the law has been slow
to protect an applicant from discrimination and the denial of rights arising from
employer decisions based on dubious data.63
When a third party accumulates social media based information related to an
individual’s profile, most times, the process does not have a deterministic verification
mechanism like credit reporting. In the existing framework, an affected applicant
cannot challenge the results of the third party verification process in the way she can
challenge the inaccurate information generated by the credit agencies. 64 Similarly,
when an individual enters the criminal justice system, such individual is accorded a
robust due process that allows for multiple steps of appellate review before a final
determination. Therefore, information available in criminal registries is mostly
accurate and deterministic and as such, has a lower chance of providing faulty
inferences on an individual than does a social media profile.
With the above in the backdrop, let us take the case of an individual engaged in
informal and casual conversations with friends in his living room. If the transcript of
such conversation became available to a potential employer, it could reveal inner
thoughts of the candidate within a non-formal setting where an individual has the
right to be left alone. This right to be left alone allows such individuals to engage in
fantasy and privacy of secluded musings—often revealed in half-baked ideas,
embarrassing snippets, or derogatory comments generated within the privacy of an
individual’s environment.65 Today’s digital immersion captures such informal
moments on Facebook or MySpace. A third party background screener should not
have unqualified access to such material for the purpose of employment decision
making, as the issues related to privacy, search and seizure, and consent
requirements are neither clear nor consistent for all applicable scenarios, especially
when applied to decision making that calls for an assessment of how an individual
would behave in a formal setting.

62 See Lawrence Lessig, Innovating Copyright, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 611, 615 (2002)
(expounding on how easily a webpage may be changed, effectively rewriting history).
63 Ken Strutin, Social Media and the Vanishing Points of Ethical and Constitutional
Boundaries, 31 PACE L. REV. 228, 242 (2011) (discussing the general lack of laws directly dealing
with social media and its implications under the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendment); see also
Sprague, supra note 9, at 416 (explaining that current privacy laws will not protect Internet
information, but statutes pertaining to “lawful conduct” may help protect that information).
64 See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681i(a)(5)(A), (a)(6), (d) (2012) (laying out the
elements for a prima facie case against a credit reporting agency, including proof of an inaccurate or
incomplete report).
65 See Alex Kozinski, The Dead Past, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 117, 123 (2012), available at
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/topics/64-SLRO-117.pdf.

[12:551 2013] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

564

B. Difference Between Traditional Credit Reporting and Social Media Screening
Many emerging legal issues come from law’s inability to catch up with
technology’s advancement.66 When the law is still lagging behind emerging
behavioral patterns, it opens up new questions that must be answered. The answers
to these emerging questions can be structured by considering existing analogous
scenarios. By evaluating which one of the scenarios closely resembles the evolving
fact pattern, a future pathway can be determined.67 In this context, the road toward
emerging law would require balancing two competing interests—the employer’s
interest in efficiently obtaining all relevant information about a prospective employee
and the applicant’s right to equity and fairness. Ultimately, this right to equity and
fairness is enshrined within the fundamental privacy right of such an applicant, as
has been manifested in government regulation of employer-employee relationships.68
The escalation in employers’ use of social media has prompted regulatory
agencies to become increasingly interested in supervising and modulating employer
behavior. Driven by a heightened desire to prevent occurrences of undue discharge of
employees based on their social network activities, the National Labor Relations
Board (“NLRB”) has become submerged in litigation.69 Similarly, the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) recently noted that third party screeners of an applicant’s social
media information must be recognized as “consumer reporting agenc[ies] under the
FCRA.”70 These and other developments have opened up new areas of concern for
the employers for the following reasons.
The methodology of aggregating social media based information to develop and
make inferences on a profile is neither mature nor deterministic at this time. 71
Despite decades of development, criminal records and credit bureau reporting often
suffer from inaccuracy.72 In social media, information does not come in a continuous
frame. Therefore, a background profile is created by aggregating a series of
incomplete and scattered snapshots of an individual and injecting inaccuracy from
66 Joshua S. Levy, Towards a Brighter Fourth Amendment: Privacy and Technological Change,
16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 499, 501–02 (2011) (stating that neither courts nor legislatures can adequately
keep pace with technological change).
67 See Raffi Varoujian, Legal Issues Arising from the Use of Social Media in the Workplace,
HELIUM (July 28, 2011), http://www.helium.com/items/2204838-legal-issues-arising-from-use-ofsocial-media-at-work (discussing tensions which exist between the law and the capabilities of the
Internet that have yet to be fully addressed by the law).
68 Sprague, supra note 9, at 398–400 (discussing possible competing interests between an
employer and an employee when it comes to employment pre-screening and further various
restrictions imposed on an employer when pre-screening potential employees).
69 Rights We Protect, NAT‘L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect (last visted
May 21, 2013); see also Karl Knauz Motors, Inc. d/b/a Knauz BMW & Robert Becker, Case 13-CA046452, 2012 NLRB LEXIS 679 (2012).
70 Mithal Letter, supra note 47.
71 See Jones et al., supra note 14.
72 Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Why Do We Convict as Many Innocent People as We Do?
Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 65, 71 (2008) (“It is hard to imagine conducting a criminal
justice system that makes substantially fewer errors.”); Chi Chi Wu, Automated Injustice: How a
Mechanized Dispute System Frustrates Consumers Seeking To Fix Errors In Their Credit Reports,
14 N.C. BANKING INST. 139, 143 (2010) (“Despite the importance of accurate credit reports . . . errors
are unfortunately quite common in the credit reporting system.”).
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slander, innuendo, and braggadocio.
Reliance on such information to make
employment decisions opens up the employer to time consuming and resource
sensitive litigation.73 This also brings up the issue of compliance with the Fourth
Amendment.
C. Risk from Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws
While cyber-vetting is not fundamentally illegal, it may introduce heightened
risks for an employer for possible violation of federal laws. Under Federal
Employment law related to discrimination, certain characteristics are accorded
protected status under federal law. For example, an employer could never ask a
potential applicant in an interview about the candidate’s age, marital status, race,
national origin, medical issues,74 and sexual orientation.75 Traditional background
reporting consisting of credit and criminal checks does not specifically target
information concerning the protected status of the applicant.76 Yet, in social media
based surveillance and searches, an employer and its third party background
provider may easily discover a potential candidate’s protected status by specific
identification of the candidate’s age, marital status, race, etc.77 If an applicant, upon
being rejected, decides to file a discrimination claim, the employer is likely to lose if,
by virtue of accessing such information in cyberspace, the employer has already
become privy to the applicant’s protected status.78 In the event of an adverse
employment decision, the employer’s obligation to adequately respond becomes even
more heightened. The employer then becomes obligated to develop a candidate
profile where specific mention of such protected status has to be identified,
documented, and shared with the applicant in order for the applicant to respond
adequately.79
73 See Sprague, supra note 9, at 399–400. Employers may unknowingly expose themselves to
violations of various federal anti-discrimination laws.
Id. at 416. Federal law prohibits
discrimination based on race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, disability, pregnancy, or
genetic information. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (prohibiting employment discrimination
based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (prohibiting age
discrimination); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on disability);
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on “pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions”); Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (Feb. 10, 2000) (prohibiting
the Federal Government from discriminating against potential employees based on genetic
information).
74 See supra note 73.
75 Sexual Orientation Discrimination—It’s Illegal, At Least in D.C., WASH. D.C. EMP. L. LETTER
(Krukowski & Costello S.C., Milwaukee, Wis.), Dec. 2001 (stating that District of Columbia Human
Rights Act (“DCHRA”) goes further than Title VII in that it explicitly prohibits discrimination based
on sexual orientation, not just discrimination based on sex).
76 Performing Background Checks, N.D. EMP. L. LETTER (Vogel, Kelly, Knutson, Weir, Bye &
Hunke, Ltd., Nashville, Tenn.), Nov. 1998.
77 Maria E. Recalde, Be Cautious When Using Social Media in Hiring, N.H. BUS. REV. (Aug. 12,
2011), http://www.nhbr.com/August-12-2011/Be-cautious-when-using-social-media-in-hiring/.
78 Id.
79 15 U.S.C. § 1681m (2012); FED. TRADE COMM’N, 40 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE FAIR
CREDIT REPORTING ACT: AN FTC STAFF REPORT WITH SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATIONS 82 (2011),
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II. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST UNREASONABLE SURVEILLANCE
As noted above, technological enhancement in surveillance intrudes upon the
privacy of individuals who use social media as their primary means of
communication, and this effect is further magnified when one of these individuals
becomes the subject of pre-employment screening. Although the erosion of such
individual privacy undoubtedly conflicts with the liberty interests of an individual, 80
within the context of current employee-employer relationships, the applicant has
only limited protection.81
Therefore, the role of the employer must be re-examined against the framework
of the individual’s subjective expectation of such privacy. The Supreme Court has
already noted the need for a change in employers’ perception of the emerging norm of
digital immersion in society:
Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and information
transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but in what society
accepts as proper behavior. . . .
. . . Cell phone and text message communication are so pervasive that some
persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments

available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/07/110720fcrareport.pdf (stating employers who use
consumer reports to make employment decisions must make the adverse action disclosure by
notifying applicants before and after taking an adverse action).
80 See Saby Ghoshray, Privacy Distortion Rationale for Reinterpreting the Third-Party Doctrine
of the Fourth Amendment, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 33, 34 (2011). I had argued elsewhere that,
premised on an exigency of situation framework, privacy as a liberty interest has been muted under
superior state interests. Id. at 44. This has resulted in significant abrogation of individual privacy
in furtherance of state’s law enforcement related objectives. Id. at 78. A rapidly shrinking privacy
paradigm is inconsistent with Warren and Brandeis’ privacy concept discussed earlier, which calls
for recognizing the sacrosanct realms “of private and domestic life.” See Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 29, at 195. This broader connotation of the right to be left alone must be understood against an
increasing threat to privacy in contemporary society, as privacy must be recognized for an
individual’s inherent right of privacy within the confines that an individual creates. Extrapolating
this right to privacy would imply that these sacrosanct fundamentals would equally extend to the
interior of the home-like community of connected individuals—be it within the Twitter community,
the Facebook community, the MySpace community, or any other online community. Just because
technology has allowed the quantity and frequency of information to skyrocket does not necessarily
preclude individuals from exercising their right to be left alone. See Chip Walter, A Little Privacy,
Please, SCI. AM. (June 17, 2007), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=a-little-privacyplease.
81 Legislative action in this emerging field has so far been limited to prohibiting employers
from requesting applicants’ social media passwords in an effort to circumvent privacy protections.
Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, supra note 38 (reporting that out of
fourteen states that considered legislation that would restrict employers from requesting access to
social networking usernames and passwords of applicants, students, or employees, only Maryland,
Illinois, California, Delaware, Michigan, and New Jersey passed such a law). Additionally, as noted
above, there are indications that certain actions of third-party screeners may be regulated under the
FCRA. See Mithal Letter, supra note 47.
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for self-expression, even self-identification. That might strengthen the case
for an expectation of privacy.82
This cautionary observation by the Supreme Court sheds light on the Court’s
view of individuals’ subjective expectation of privacy. While it remains unclear what
direction the Court eventually would take within the context of an applicantemployer relationship, this passage illustrates, nonetheless, that the Court is focused
on two underlying principles. In the first, the Court formulates the contours of
individuals’ expectations of privacy indexed in the broader society’s expectation in
what the Court sees as society’s expectation of an acceptable behavior framework. 83
In the second, the Court modulates individuals’ privacy expectations based on finding
a necessary ingredient of individuals’ self-expression.84 What the Court is hinting at
here is the fundamental need for individuals to express themselves, an area that I
have explored in detail elsewhere.85 Certainly, the Court’s observation here would
sway the balance more in favor of an individual right, as opposed to employers’
legitimate business concerns. Against the paucity of applicable legislative
enactments, and in an environment where an employer has superior capability to
track every digital footprint of an individual, it is important to chart the applicable
territory of what might constitute reasonable surveillance and what protectionist
paradigms may be available to an applicant.86 Ultimately, any such paradigm must
be framed based on applicable legal guidance obtained from the Constitution’s
Fourth Amendment.87 It is important, therefore, to review the Katz doctrine.88

City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629–30 (2010).
Id. at 2629–30.
84 Id. at 2630.
85 See Ghoshray, supra note 80, at 52, 71.
86 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2631 (2010). The Court’s observation in Quon is in the context of a public
employee’s Fourth Amendment right against his government employer’s “unreasonable searches and
Seizures.” Id. at 2624. Applying this standard might provide an individual, who is yet to become an
employee, a much higher protection against employer surveillance, as the Quon Court recognizes the
employee as an individual who has a right to self-expression in social media. Id. at 2630. This is
because the Quon Court’s observation is applied in the context of a public employee-employer
relationship, which is a rather restrictive scenario. Other Fourth Amendment cases have noted that
employees’ privacy protection in the workplace varies as a function of the nature of the bilateral
employee-employer relationship that defines the contour of the “operational realities of the
workplace.” See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717–18 (1987) (linking employees’ right to
privacy with the operational realities of the workplace—a reality that derives its existence from the
nature of employee-employer relationships). Thus, the Supreme Court jurisprudence on employee
protection from privacy intrusion is neither settled nor fixed. Focusing on the interest of an
applicant, there remains uncertainty with respect to the strength of an employer-employee
relationship, based on whether an employer’s right to search an applicant profile may be limited.
On the contrary, the Court has given employers a much higher threshold with which to conduct
searches of employees’ communication if such searches are conducted with the objective of protecting
an employer’s legitimate business interests, such as investigating employee misconduct at work or
probing employee misdeeds. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2632. If a potential employer can connect the
online search of an applicant’s digital footprints with legitimate business interests and if such a
search can be conducted via the applicant’s consent, the employer may have a better chance of
prevailing. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725.
87 See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 714–22.
82
83
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A. Applying the Katz Doctrine in Employer Surveillance of Employees
Society has little or no knowledge of the particular surveillance techniques an
employer has at its disposal. An individual applicant is at a disadvantage when
trying to adequately develop a viewpoint on which a digital footprint may be under
scrutiny and what information is within the scope of potential employer
surveillance.89 Implicit in the Supreme Court’s Katz v. United States90 decision is a
roadmap to determine how far individuals’ privacy should dictate the limits of a
supervisory power—whether coming from the government or from an employer
acting in a supervisory capacity.91 In his concurrence in Katz, Justice Harlan set out
a new standard which, except for law enforcement intrusion cases, has become the
reference point for balancing individual privacy with supervisory legitimate interests
as per the Fourth Amendment.92 Justice Harlan articulated a two-prong test for
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches that can be extended
to employer-sponsored surveillance.93
Reviewing the Katz doctrine to evaluate the emerging surveillance trend within
the employment context, we should recognize at the outset, that an applicant must
have exhibited an actual or subjective expectation of privacy. 94 Then, this actual
expectation must be evaluated as something that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.95 In articulating this two-prong test, Justice Harlan had followed the
88 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). While referring
to Justice Harlan’s famous test in Katz, Professor Peter Winn observed that:

[In] Justice Harlan’s concurrence on its merits, we have seen that in working on
the reasonable expectation of privacy test, he refined the test in his own way,
adding both a subjective and an objective component. Perhaps he thought that
the subjective component was needed to clarify that, although an objective
expectation of privacy might exist, a subjective expectation might not, as when a
person in his (objectively private) home is overheard intentionally speaking in a
loud voice out of on open window. . . . Perhaps Justice Harlan felt the subjective
component of the test was still needed to mirror the old trespass element that an
intrusion lack permission. However, when applying the test in subsequent cases,
even Harlan himself only referenced the objective component.
Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test, 40 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 1, 11 (2009).
89 See Sam Kamin, The Private is Public: The Relevance of Private Actors in Defining the
Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 83, 121, 145 (2004).
90 Katz, 389 U.S. at 347. Taking a renewed look at the fundamentals of the privacy interests
under the Katz holding, a subjective expectation of privacy by the individual must be evaluated at
the next level of abstraction that requires evaluating the scope qualitatively and quantitatively. An
individual’s subjective expectation of privacy must be evaluated and the means of evaluation is
dependent on identifying society’s reasonable expectation—an objective framework. Therefore, the
crux of the issue relies on identifying society’s recognizable, reasonable expectations.
91 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; Kamin, supra note 89, at 145.
92 See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting
the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1363, 1372
(2004).
93 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
94 Id.
95 Id.
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Katz majority’s robust interpretation of the Fourth Amendment by noting that “the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” 96 Since the Katz decision more than
a half-century back, the Fourth Amendment driven individual expectation of privacy
has continued to be defined by Justice Harlan’s “reasonable expectation of privacy”
test to decide whether unreasonable search and surveillance violates individuals’
Fourth Amendment rights.97 The doctrinal implications of Katz as animated within
the importance of the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is still a valid
concept and thus, must be re-imagined within the evolving context of the social
media framework of today.98 This calls for taking a renewed look at the fundamental
privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment.99
A Katz analysis can be conceptually difficult as it requires developing a
relationship between an objective framework and a subjective framework.100 Thus,
identifying a set of deterministic benchmarks is necessary to provide judicial
efficiency and consistency.101
In trying to identify the scope of an individual’s actual expectation of privacy, it
is important, therefore, to develop all ancillary fact patterns surrounding such
individual’s behavioral pattern.102 If, in the conduct of his or her digitally mediated
behavior, the individual exhibits a shared sense of space and shows extreme
reluctance to utilize available privacy settings in the digital communication
pathway,103 this could lower the threshold of such individual’s actual expectation of
privacy.104 Staying within the framework of such individual’s subjective expectation,
See id.
See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 287 (1994) (applying the Harlan Fourth Amendment
analysis to police surveillance in a drug prosecution case); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,
947 (2012) (discussing the Harlan concurrence in the context of a GPS tracking device); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984) (applying the Harlan reasonableness standard to a contraband
search of a prison cell).
98 See Net Impact: US Becomes a Facebook Nation, BUS. NEWS DAILY (Apr. 6, 2011, 4:20 PM),
http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/840-facebook-smartphone-majority-americans-online-.html
(discussing the continuing rise in Facebook membership amongst Americans); Julia Angwin, How
Much Should People Worry About the Loss of Online Privacy?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2011, 3:56 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204190704577024262567105738.html
(discussing
the impact the Internet has on daily life and why protecting the privacy of that activity is
important).
99 See ARI SCHWARTZ ET AL., CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., DIGITAL SEARCH & SEIZURE:
UPDATING PRIVACY PROTECTIONS TO KEEP PACE WITH TECHNOLOGY 3 (2006), https://www.cdt.org/
publications/digital-search-and-seizure.pdf.
100 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
101 See David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J.
143, 207–08 (2002).
102 See, e.g., id. at 159–60 (providing that protection against surveillance technologies also
depends on where the suspect is and whether the suspect is in his or her home).
103 See Matt Markovich, Survey:
Many Facebook Users Not Using Privacy Settings,
KOMONEWS.COM (May 3, 2012, 6:15 PM), http://www.komonews.com/news/consumer/Facebook--150
105135.html; Sharing Personal Information Online, PERPETUITY RES. (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://www.perpetuityresearch.com/blog/?p=115.
104 See Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S. 2d 650, 656 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (stating that a
person has a lower expectation of privacy when that person has chosen to disclose information);
Kellie A. O’Shea, Use of Social Media in Employment: Should I Fire? Should I Hire?, CORNELL HR
REV. (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.cornellhrreview.org/use-of-social-media-in-employment-should-i96
97
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it is possible to identify various subjective thresholds, a set of triggers left along an
individual’s footprint, each of which can be captured via specific questions: How
much sharing of private personal communication the individual conducts? At what
frequency such individual shares sensitive personal information with wider society?
Does the individual use available privacy settings in her digital environment?
Evaluating the answers to such questions would entail the second phase of
construction to evaluate the nature, scope, and quantitative element in that
subjective expectation. What makes that subjective expectation of an applicant a
reasonable expectation?
There may be specific exigent business rationales that can supersede an
applicant’s otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy on account of a probable
cause or immediately available information regarding the applicant.105 However, the
evaluation or recognition of society’s reasonable expectation of privacy has been the
subject of debate in various parlances. Implicit in this evaluation is the concept of
the third party doctrine, an area highlighted in detail elsewhere.106 Society’s
fire-should-i-hire/ (asserting that users who decide to grant public access to their social media
profiles “should expect little if any expectation of privacy with that employer or company”).
Immersed in digital media and online social networking sites, contemporary individuals are often
times driven by an exigent need to update their social networking status while signaling to the
external world almost every instance of their personal lives. See O’Shea, supra; Rick Hampson,
Twitter at 7: Smart or Stupid, We Are What We Tweet, USA TODAY (Mar. 20, 2013, 5:14 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/19/age-old-bad-judgment-lives-long-in-digitalage/2001557/ (stating that there are more than 400 million tweets a day). Because the majority of
these individuals are connected to multiple other individuals via social media, a one-to-one
connection can become a many-to-many connection relatively easily. See Kevin Lewis et al., The
Taste for Privacy: An Analysis of College Student Privacy Settings in an Online Social Network, 14
J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 79 (2008), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/
j.1083-6101.2008.01432.x/pdf. As a result, despite various privacy settings offered in social media,
intimate personal details may no longer stay private and secluded within an individual’s personal
space. See id. Individuals may be eroding their own expectations of privacy, without even
recognizing the long term consequences of their behavior. Thus, within a discussion of individual
privacy erosion, we must not allow the personal responsibility of an individual to be left out of the
discussion. Especially if we recognize, regardless of an ever enchanting array of digital gadgets
corporations place before an individual, they also offer various privacy mechanisms that individuals
can employ. Despite the ease of digital communication, individuals should adequately protect the
gateway to their communications, in order to establish their right to privacy in cyberspace.
105 See, e.g., Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908, 913 (Mass. 1982) (stating that, with
regard to public policy, the intrusion of the privacy rights of an employee is measured against the
nature of the employee’s job in regards to the reasonableness of the intrusion); French v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 128, 131 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding that there are “circumstances in
which it is legitimate for an employer to know some ‘personal’ information about its employees” as
long as the information relates to the effectiveness of the employee’s job performance and
employment).
106 See Ghoshray, supra note 80, at 36–37.
The third party doctrine brings additional
complexity in the pre-employment screening framework, and as such, this should remain outside the
scope of the current discussion. For additional reference, see Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth
Amendment and the “Legitimate Expectation of Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1311–12 (1981);
Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV.
1229, 1248–50, 1252–53 (1983); Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State,
93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 19 (2008); Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for
Shared Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 211, 213–14 (2006); Stephen E.
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reasonable expectation of privacy can be attenuated based on digital communication
that an individual has already engaged in by sharing personal protected information
with any third party service provider. This area has doctrinal implications that might
bring in additional complexities to the employee and employer relationship that shall
remain outside the scope of the current discussion. Stepping away from the
dichotomy between human interaction and automated interaction, the bone of
contention in the doctrinal difficulty in third party doctrine, the focus can be turned
to other factors that impact the relationship between an applicant’s subjective
expectation of privacy and society’s reasonable expectation of such privacy.
Therefore, while charting the normative scope of social media screening, it is
important to identify the outliers—a set of individuals whose subjective expectation
of privacy may not match society’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The law
surrounding use and abuse of social networking must adequately address these
issues; otherwise, the equality doctrine might be in jeopardy.107
This includes individuals who may not be active in social media. The privacy
rights of such individuals must be evaluated at a more elevated threshold than the
other two types of individuals discussed previously. The law must ensure that a lone
ranger is immune to the deleterious impact of society—such an individual conception
of a subjective expectation of privacy must not be comingled with the masses, and the
employee-employer legal framework must structure reasonable protection for such
individuals.108 Because, if one is not immersed in technology even by the virtue of
living in the society, this individual must not be subjected to the broader society
norms.109
It is important, therefore, to understand how individuals’ personal behavior may
be shaping their expectations, an area that has not received much attention in
literature or contemporary discourse. The following section will highlight this area
in further detail in order to develop a more realistic linkage between an individual’s
Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third
Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 976–77 (2007).
107 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming Spring 2013) (manuscript at 28–30), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2208883.
108 See Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
3, 22 (stating that in almost all analyses of an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in their
electronic communications, the analysis will be evaluated under the objective prong of what society
deems to be reasonable, rather than under the subjective prong).
109 See Strutin, supra note 63, at 252 n.69 (2011) (explaining that, simply because a certain
kind of technology is used in a community as a whole, it does not mean that a particular defendant
has notice of that fact). The idea of evaluating an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy
based on society’s reasonable expectation has an inherent drawback. For example, if the majority of
people within the society are sufficiently acclimatized into digital communication via social media,
the majority’s privacy expectation may not comport with the minority population that are
consciously decoupled from pervasive digital immersion. Thus, society’s reasonable expectation
cannot be a proxy to these individuals’ privacy expectations. The law must be structured in such a
way that all individuals’ privacy concerns are adequately addressed by its imposition. See, e.g.,
Junichi P. Semitsu, From Facebook to Mug Shot: How the Dearth of Social Networking Privacy
Rights Revolutionized Online Government Surveillance, 31 PACE L. REV. 291, 371 (2011) (stating
that an individual’s expectation of privacy should be based on the individual’s expectation of privacy
from government surveillance, rather than on the user’s individual expectations).
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subjective expectation and society’s reasonable expectation of privacy within the
context of an applicant-employer relationship.
B. Playing the Part Versus Fourth Amendment
The practice of cyber-vetting candidates for employment presents two key
problems for employers. The first comes from relying on information generated from
social media, and the second comes from intrusion into the privacy of an individual.
Social media has given post-modern individuals a newfound sense of empowerment.
In a world where anyone with an iPad, iPhone, or laptop and an Internet connection
can become a celebrity, or pretend to be one, an individual may erroneously create an
online digital profile that does not truly reflect that individual’s employment
eligibility or credentials. By taking on different roles, the individual is engaged in a
performance for his or her pre-selected community. Knowing full well that he or she
is being seen, watched, and followed, the individual engages in a display of emotions
and behaviors that she would not likely reveal in a formal setting.110 This act is part
of an ongoing theme—playing for the audience. Oftentimes, the audiences are selfselected community members with whom the individual has voluntarily associated.111
These behavioral norms must be left as distinct from expected behavior in an
employment setting.
Employers’ use of third parties to scoop those bits of information and create a
profile of the candidate is not a prudent way of judging an individual’s candidacy.
This aggregation process is imprecise and fraught with inaccuracy and
unreliability.112 Without training in behavioral science or social psychology, a third
party aggregator of social media information is certainly not capable of creating an
individual profile that accurately reflects how an individual would behave in a formal
setting within an employer-employee relationship. Because social media exchanges
are not reliable predictors of an individual’s employment potential, hiring decisions
should never be made on the basis of such information.
Besides generating erroneous conclusions, gathering social media information
opens up to a broader Fourth Amendment issue. The fundamental difference
between obtaining information from traditional sources, such as judicial decisions
and credit reports, and obtaining information by way of social media exchanges is
that the former is available in the public domain, whereas the latter is part of a

110 See De Armond, supra note 10, at 1131 (likening the information taken from social media to
that of personality tests and stating that this information reveals too much of an individual’s private
being and is an inaccurate analysis of information that an employer may need).
111 See, e.g., Brent Johnson, More People are Turning to Internet Dating, EZINEMARK.COM (Dec.
11, 2011), http://technology.ezinemark.com/more-people-are-turning-to-internet-dating-7d3272155e
72.html (discussing how people are turning more and more to the Internet, often to conduct their
most intimate and personal activities, such as finding a romantic partner).
112 See State v. Bell, 882 N.E.2d 502, 512 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2008) (acknowledging that
information gathered from a social media account could potentially be “incomplete, easily altered, or
possibly from an unidentified third party using [one’s] account”).

[12:551 2013]The Emerging Reality of Social Media: Erosion of Individual Privacy 573
Through Cyber-vetting and Law’s Inability to Catch Up

protected private space.113 The individual in question is a member of the common
public as an applicant for a particular job who has not yet joined the employer’s
organization. This individual should be treated as an individual who has equal
rights in every aspect. Here we are evaluating the balance between predicting an
employee’s future success and retaining that individual’s privacy rights. However,
these two scenarios are not analogous. In the case of employee monitoring, by virtue
of becoming part of an organization, the employee has subjected to the employer’s
business interests, whereby such employee’s right to privacy may have been
attenuated. While a narrower threshold of privacy may apply with respect to the
employer’s ability to engage in surveillance of its employee,114 a much higher
threshold of privacy must insulate an applicant from employer surveillance. This
applicant-employee distinction resides at the center of determining the scope of
employer surveillance and the boundary of individual privacy rights. In the absence
of applicable legislative enactment or specific case law to guide us, our understanding
of this evolving applicant-employer relationship has to be animated by the
fundamental assertion of Fourth Amendment rights enshrined in the Katz two-prong
test.
In both pre-employment and post-employment scenarios, we are testing the
equilibrium between an employer’s right to legitimate business interest and an
individual’s right to privacy. When the relationship changes from employee-employer
to applicant-employer, employers’ surveillance ability must attenuate to enhance the
applicant’s privacy right. Because the applicant has not become part of the employee
pool, she must retain her right to live freely within her selected environment—she
must retain her right to be left alone.
III. EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES IN ONLINE SEARCHES
A. Privacy and Anti-Discrimination in Cyber-vetting
Because hiring individuals for employment is a paradigmatic example of
investment under uncertainty,115 developing an individual profile based on
identifying signals from available, observable characteristics attached to an
individual is an example of information transfer within the framework of information
asymmetry in the market.116 Scholars have noted that the employment market
exhibits all of the characteristics of a market where signaling takes place in various

113 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1681(k) (2012) (stating that consumer reports given for employment
purposes compile items of information on consumers that are matters of public record), with O’Shea,
supra note 104 (stating that regardless of privacy disclosures on users’ social media account
settings, users still maintain an expectation of privacy in certain circumstances).
114 See Michael E. Lackey Jr. & Joseph P. Minta, Lawyers and Social Media: The Legal Ethics
of Tweeting, Facebooking and Blogging, 28 TOURO L. REV. 149, 180 (2012).
115 Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. OF ECON. 355, 356–58 (1973).
116 Id. at 356–58.
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forms.117 In the pre-cyber-vetting era, such signaling took place based on an
aggregation of deterministic characteristics such as educational background,
employment experience, race, gender, and sex. Though these characteristics continue
to be subject to manipulation and can shape decisions based on subjective
assessment, cyber-vetting brings forth a more pronounced specter of discrimination
potential. By transforming random subjective assessment into a more pronounced
deliberate omission of individuals, this raises the issue of whether privacy and antidiscrimination are conceptually at odds with each other. 118
Signaling in the employment marketplace is the process of distilling patterns
from a spectrum of observed personal characteristics to develop a model of predictive
analysis.119 As pre-cyber-vetting hiring evaluations predominantly dealt with
deterministic data, the divergence between subjective assessment and objective
determination was kept within a more allowable and reasonable bound.120 With the
proliferation of social media exuberance among individuals and the enhancement in
the ability of big data, a potential employer can sort and analyze a vast amount of
data and mine for patterns within the conglomeration of incomplete and imprecise
information to predict personalities from social networking sites.121 As this
propensity for data mining for predictive analyses becomes rampant, the distributive
implication of privacy is thrust into increasing tension with the objective of antidiscrimination.122 A significant absence of robust laws to ensure privacy protection
from undue intrusion into the private affairs makes this framework more adverse for
117 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination,
Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595, 631–32 (1993); Tamara Russell, Digging
the Dirt: Digital Tips for Employers and Job Seekers, OR. ST. B. BULL., Aug.–Sept. 2010, at 48;
Robert Sprague, Googling Job Applicants: Incorporating Personal Information into Hiring
Decisions, 23 LAB. L. 19, 20 (2007); Alan Finder, When a Risqué Online Persona Undermines a
Chance for a Job, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 11, 2006), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=F30
712F739550C728DDDAF0894DE404482.
118 Michelle Sherman, Social Medial Research + Employment Decisions: May be a Recipe for
Litigation, CYBERSPACE LAW, Apr. 2011, at 1, 1–3.
119 See Spence, supra note 115, at 356.
120 Compare Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding preemployment drug screening for District Attorney employment to be a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment), and Anderson v. Philadelphia, 845 F.2d 1216, 1225 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding,
as reasonable, the use of polygraph testing for pre-employment screening of potential police officers),
and Stephen F. Befort, Pre-Employment Screening and Investigation: Navigating Between a Rock
and a Hard Place, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 365, 368–69 (1997) (explaining how employers use
“screening-in” to vet for qualities they seek in an employee and “screening-out” using recorded past
events as an indication of how the employee with perform in employment duties), with Elefant, Do
Employers Using Facebook for Background Checks Face Legal Risks?, LAW.COM LEGAL BLOG WATCH
(Mar. 1, 2008), http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/legal_blog_watch/2008/03/do-employers-us.html
(explaining employers’ use of social media to perform subjective and speculative personality
background checks).
121 Stephanie Mlot, Raytheon Riot Software Predicts Behavior Based on Social Media, PCMag,
(Feb. 12, 2013, 2:46 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2415340,00.asp (describing claims
by a security company to predict potential and current employee behavior by tracking all possible
online activity).
122 See De Armond, supra note 10, at 1133–34 (likening determinations based on social media
to those of a personality test and arguing that such determinations are likely to contain
inaccuracies).
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individuals within the cyber-vetting context.123 While social networking has created
ease of communication and provided access to multiple and simultaneous exchanges,
it has also coaxed individuals in leaving vast amounts of digital data in cyberspace,124
for employers to search and distill patterns for predictive employment based
analyses.
Although law’s objective is to ensure equity—equity manifested in similar
scenarios having equal outcomes125—employers continue to focus on a flawed
conceptual apparatus for signaling and information transfer. These subjective
evaluations are tainted by the preponderance of incomplete, imprecise, and
unverifiable information that percolates through the random musing of social
networking sites.126 Because law has not caught up with technology’s evolution,127
some behavioral norms, such as employers’ penchant to engage in random and
rampant searches, have remained outside the purview of legal sanctions. 128 This
intrusion into individual privacy has opened the door for expansive discrimination.
For example, a particular employer can search in various social media sites to distill
a pattern for a particular individual and thereby make judgments on the individual’s
suitability for a particular employment role—all without obtaining the individual’s
consent to such a search. In the absence of adequate individual privacy protection
law, denial of employment based on matching an individual’s privately obtained
profile with a desired profile raises the specter of discrimination. Although federal

123 Raffi Varoujian, Legal Issues Arising from the Use of Social Media in the Workplace,
HELIUM (July 28, 2011), http://www.helium.com/items/2204838-legal-issues-arising-from-the-use-ofsocial-media-in-the-workplace (discussing current tensions which exist between the law and the
capabilities of the Internet that have yet to be fully addressed by the law); see also Christopher
Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The American Bar Association’s Tentative
Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383, 389 (1997) (explaining that even in the early days of
technological privacy issues, courts needed to reassess privacy interests); Lyria Bennett Moses,
Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up with Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 239, 241 (2007) (noting that the law has fallen behind technology).
124 Zack Whittaker, How Much Data is Consumed Every Minute?, ZDNET (June 22, 2012, 8:52
PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/how-much-data-is-consumed-every-minute/80666. The amount
of data running through the Internet is “baffling, and downright crazy.” Id. For example, each day,
“[e]mail users send more than 204 million messages; . . . Google receives over 2 million search
queries; YouTube users upload 48 hours of new video; Facebook users share 684,000 bits of content;
[and] Twitter users send more than 100,000 tweets.” Id. Moreover, Technology-enabled
communication has moved beyond the point-to-point communication of yesteryear to a combination
of distributed transmission and third-party-enabled communication, where various third-party
providers are not only storing data, but also processing it to make the system more efficient and
enhance the experience of users. See Connie Davis Powell, “You Already Have Zero Privacy. Get
Over It!” Would Warren and Brandeis Argue for Privacy for Social Networking?, 31 PACE L. REV.
146, 166 n.107, 167, 173 (2011) (describing details on various third-party mechanisms in
communication, social media, and Internet).
125 See Saby Ghoshray, Hijacked by Statistics, Rescued by Wal-Mart v. Dukes:
Probing
Commonality and Due Process Concerns in Modern Class Action Litigation, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 467,
471–72 (2012).
126 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
127 Supra note 123 and accompanying text.
128 See Bentley, supra note 48.
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law prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, and gender,129 no current law clearly
proscribes discrimination based on derived and inferred personality traits.
B. Legal Liability for Statistical Discrimination Based on Observable Characteristics
This phenomenon of social media-aided employment screening implicates two
important constitutional protections—the First Amendment freedom of expression
and the Fourth Amendment right of privacy.130 While the Fourth Amendment issue
arising out of intrusive searches has found its voice in contemporary discourse, First
Amendment issues related to employment screening have not been part of the
contemporary discussion.131
The First Amendment protects citizens’ speech. The existing constitutional
cases discuss the employee’s First Amendment right of speech protection in the
workplace context while the employee is gainfully employed within an
organization.132 Yet, because social media thrusts pre-employment expressive
conduct and speech into the hiring context, the question of whether First
Amendment protection may apply in this context is a valid discussion point that has
not been addressed.
As an individual becomes aware of a digital war against privacy, in a new
economy perhaps, freedom of expression may become subject to suppression as
individuals become aware of the broader reach of employment screening. Individuals
may become reluctant to express their opinions for fear of the potential effect of those
opinions on their employment prospects. Such a development runs counter to each
individual’s fundamental right to express her opinion and affect the democratic
process. If a potential employee recognizes a priori that anything he or she expresses
in a public forum could be found in a future search as part of digital data mining for
distilling patterns for a “suitable” employee, the individual will be more inclined to
suppress her thoughts than to express them.
This again brings us to an emerging tension between the right to employment
and the right to expression.133 The fundamental question is whether the right to
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing protection for the freedom of speech), and U.S.
CONST. amend. IV (providing protection from unreasonable search and seizure), with Alan Finder,
For Some, Online Persona Undermines a Résumé, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2006), http://www.nytimes
.com/2006/06/11/us/11recruit.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&# (explaining that even in the early years of
Facebook and MySpace, employers were screening potential employees using their assumptively
privacy-protected social media profiles).
131 Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (applying a
Fourth Amendment analysis to a situation involving information transmitted from a telephone
booth); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (applying a Fourth Amendment analysis to a
situation involving searching a student’s purse for suspected cigarettes).
132 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006) (explaining that the Supreme Court has
been clear that employees do not surrender their First Amendment rights at the door of their places
of employment).
133 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1972) (discussing the
property interest that tenured or contracted professors have in continued employment when a
professor’s contract was not renewed after he criticized the administration).
129
130
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expression in the new digital economy is being subsumed under the right to
employment. While the Fourth Amendment privacy right within the employment
search context is a more pronounced and tangible issue, how the First Amendment
right is being implicated within a broader privacy encroachment via digital searches
of individual footprints is not as clear in the contemporary discourse. This
observation, therefore, is intended to bring awareness that there is a danger to
freedom of speech and freedom of thought currently arising out of cyber-vetting.134
C. Cyber-vetting and the Conflict with Social Contract Theory
Almost as old as modern civilization, social contract theory originated from Plato
and Socrates.135 Nurtured in the modern era by Hobbes,136 Rousseau,137 and Hume,138
social contract theory posits that individuals in a society surrender some of their
freedoms and submit to the authority of a supervisory entity in exchange for the
protection of their remaining—fundamental—rights. Implicit in this paradigm is the
core belief of individual consent.139 Yet, the digital explosion and the ease of
technology have created a dystopian nightmare.140 The related supervisory entities,
the government, the big corporations, and even the smaller employers have rejected
social contract theory as a paradigm,141 whereby the right to consent by an individual
has been sublimated within the right of an employer. Yet, the individual has a
concomitant right to a meaningful employment for which she should be allowed to
expose her credentials, but not her private affairs. This emerging inconsistency must
be evaluated for its full implications within the context of cyber-vetting with the
objective of refining labor practices and employment law.

134 See Stephen J. Kobrin, With Technology Growing, Our Privacy is Shrinking, PHILA.
INQUIRER (Jan. 3, 2001), https://mgmt.wharton.upenn.edu/files/?whdmsaction=public:main.file&file
ID=3992 (providing a discussion on the shrinking privacy space with the advent of technology in
communication); James D. Phillips & Katharine E. Kohm, Current and Emerging Transportation
Technology: Final Nails in the Coffin of the Dying Right of Privacy?, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 10
(2011) (arguing that advances in technology have led to Supreme Court decisions that have created
confusion about Fourth Amendment privacy law).
135 Celeste Friend, Social Contract Theory, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct. 15, 2004),
http://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/.
136 Id.; see generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C. Crawford Brough Macpherson ed.,
Centraal Boekhuis 1985) (1651).
137 Friend, supra note 135; see generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE BASIC POLITICAL
WRITINGS (Donald A. Cress ed., 2d ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1987).
138 See DAVID HUME, ESSAYS, MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY (Eugene F. Miller, ed., Liberty
Fund, Inc. 1987) (1742), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Hume/hmMPL35.html.
139 See Friend, supra note 135.
140 See Daniel J. Solove, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 27 (2004) (noting how the “Big Brother” figure of George Orwell’s dystopian novel
1984 has become a central metaphor in discussions concerning privacy and technology).
141 See Haefner, supra note 4 (describing instances in which employers will deny a candidate
employment based on conduct revealed through social media); see also Sanders, supra note 56, at
258 (suggesting that employers obtain written consent before initiating a social media background
check).
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In yet another reversal for distributive implications of privacy, in the absence of
deterministic behavioral history such as a criminal history registry or a credit score,
employer-sponsored cyber-vetting engages in the search of a potential employee’s
digital footprint142 by navigating imprecise information gleaned from social
networking sites. Such search processes create illegitimate proxies for an individual
profile based on snippets, musings, third party innuendos, and private exchanges of
an individual to develop a predictive profile of the individual’s employment
candidacy. The law has yet to respond to this imprecise and flawed subjective
assessment based on intrusive privacy violations and unbridled data mining in which
employers continue to engage.
As cyber-vetting continues to place privacy and speech at loggerheads with the
attenuation of privacy we can see the right to expression is beginning to eviscerate.
For example, an individual, staying within the permissible bounds of social norms
and legal framework, can engage in producing an explicit sex video tape with another
consenting adult individual. While the objective is mediated by individual preference,
the social contract theory posits that the product of such act is not for public
consumption, and therefore, the public should not be privy to such viewing of the
recorded tape. In the social media-enabled societal landscape, such an individual can
restrict the distribution of a product among a set of people belonging to a restricted
set of digital communities.143 Yet, unscrupulous on-line searches by an employer,
The asymmetry between the technological sophistication of an employer’s surveillance and
the targeted applicant’s awareness of such technology can be compared with the asymmetry that
exists between the technological sophistication of the United States’ drone operation in Afghanistan
and Yemen and the targets’ awareness of such monitoring. See Drones: What Are They and How Do
They Work? BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10713898 (last updated Jan 31,
2012) (describing drones’ ability to gather intelligence and deliver precision strikes “without the
need for more intrusive military action”). Like the suspected terrorists targeted by drones, most
applicants have very little idea about the sophisticated tracking ability of potential employers’
digital surveillance methodologies and mechanisms. See Rachel Zupek, How Social Media Can Hurt
Your Career, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2009/LIVING/worklife/08/24/cb.job.social.medial.pitfalls/
(last updated Aug. 24, 2009) (describing how software company monitored and responded to
potential hire’s negative tweets and explaining how employees often post negative tweets about
their jobs without realizing that their employers have an increasingly high presence in social
media). Currently, a variety of employer surveillance software use sophisticated mechanisms to
follow employees’ digital footprints. Brittany Petersen, Employee Monitoring: It’s Not Paranoia—
You Really Are Being Watched!, PCMAG.COM (May 26, 2008, 10:40 AM), http://www.pcmag
.com/article2/0,2817,2308363,00.asp. It must be recognized that the search of an individual’s
personal space, regardless of whether it is a physical dwelling or a virtual community, is against
traditional constitutional protection. This view follows the main doctrinal trajectory of Justice
Harlan’s two-part test. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
The limits to the surveillance power of a supervisory entity can be reasonably identified by
evaluating the scope of an individual’s expectation of her own privacy. Therefore, the broader idea
is that a threshold for search and seizure within the context of an individual’s private space can be
developed by keeping the basic constitutional premises of privacy and liberty viable against an
onslaught of technological advancement.
143 See Alex Wawro, 12 Simple Steps to Safer Social Networking, PC WORLD (Mar. 22, 2013,
3:02 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2031456/12-simple-steps-to-safer-social-networking.html.
The right to privacy must equally extend to both the interior of the physical space called home and
within the confines of the home-like community of connected individuals—be it within the Twitter
community, the Facebook community, the MySpace community, or any other online community.
This is because these are self-selected communities that individuals have identified based on
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working with the benefit of a lack of legal precedents, can access such prohibited
material and develop a flawed assessment of an individual for the predictive analytic
purpose of determining such individual’s suitability for a particular employment.
Not only is such a search into an individual’s secluded zone of private affairs against
social contract theory, it also violates both the First Amendment right to freedom of
expression and the Fourth Amendment right to be secure within one’s private
surroundings. In the absence of settled law, robust legislation, and precedent judicial
determination, using cyber-vetting and employment screening to find the suitable
candidate has become an unbridled exercise in developing unfair inferences. This
certainly puts privacy and anti-discrimination on a collision course, while implicating
the basic fundamental constitutional rights of free speech. This has also attenuated
both the right to employment and the right to privacy by pitting the right to
employment against the right to expression. 144 Clearly, social media searches of an
individual have distorted the fundamental paradigm of signaling in the employment
marketplace, where a robust conceptual apparatus for appropriate information
transfer is either missing or severely flawed.
IV. A PATH FORWARD—ALLOWABLE CONTOURS OF SEARCHES
Fundamentally, online searches of a candidate’s social media activities have the
potential to generate subjective and flawed inferences. Therefore, the law must
impose a reasonableness or probable cause standard for intrusion against a potential
employee’s private seclusion. At its core, the purpose of cyber-vetting is to ensure an
employer’s legitimate business interest.145 In the absence of objective indicia, an
employer is looking to ensure that potential employees are trustworthy and conduct
themselves in a manner consistent with societal standards. In essence, through
cyber-vetting, an employer is trying to develop a predictable and suitable employee
profile by relying on an individual’s observable characteristics as manifested in
online activities. If, however, an employer is settled on developing a cyber-vetting
program, the process must be implemented within the framework of law, taking into
consideration both existing and emerging regulatory schemes. More importantly, a
search of an individual’s digital footprint has the potential to both uncover
anomalies146 and surprises.147 Employers must be prepared to deal with the legal
consequences of such unexpected knowledge.
commonalities of interest or shared values. Namsu Park, et al., Being Immersed In Social
Networking Environment: Facebook Groups, Uses, and Gratifications, and Social Outcomes, 12
CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 729, 729 (2009). The increased amount of information available and
ease with which it can be accessed should not prevent these individuals from exercising their right
to be left alone. See Walter, supra note 80.
144 Sprague, supra note 48, at 7 (describing balance between individual’s right to privacy and
employer’s interest in uncovering information about potential hires).
145 Del Riego et al., supra note 18, at 17. A slew of litigation in the last decade reveals a
potential Achilles’ heel for employers.
146 See Zupek, supra note 142 (describing termination that occurred after an employer
discovered comments an employee had made on Facebook, in which the employee stated that she
found her job boring).
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This can be illustrated with several examples. First, in the event of a conflict,
the employer must carefully recognize that, while information provided on a resume
or job application is likely verifiable and deterministic, the information gleaned from
an online search could be imprecise or incomplete. Therefore, the danger of false
positives may occur, such as basing adverse employment decisions on online
information that is applicable to another person or that was falsely manufactured to
harm the person under review.148
Second, if an online search reveals an individual’s audio or video post, even if
such digital post may be contrary to an employer’s societal mores or behavioral
expectation, the employer must find a legitimate linkage between such post and the
potential employee’s unsuitability for the job. This may thrust the employer into a
legal liability based on personality-based discrimination, by placing privacy and antidiscrimination concerns at odds with each other.
Third, even if an online search of an individual’s digital activities reveals that
the individual may have been engaged in hate, criminal, or terrorist organizations,
the First Amendment speech implications must be carefully analyzed prior to making
a final determination of the individual’s future job status. Thus, employers’ legal
liability based on violations of the First Amendment is a real concern that employers
must recognize.
Fourth, an employer may be in danger of acquiring certain types of information
that may bring in heightened legal liability in an attempt to develop efficient and
appropriate personnel practices by revealing information related to protected
classes.149
Therefore, when implementing a cyber-vetting policy, an employer must take
into consideration a number of factors. These factors can present as allowable
contour of scope and context of search procedure the employer may engage in. The
list could be exhaustive, but can be categorized under a set of broader themes. Each
theme can be further illuminated by exploring a set of relevant questions.
1. Temporal Aspect and Scope of Cyber-vetting
The questions that must animate the framework are as follows: At what stage
during the hiring process should cyber-vetting occur? What should constitute cybervetting? What happens when the personnel involved in privileged information are
related to a protected status? At what stages during employment should cybervetting occur? Should notice of cyber-vetting be given to those being vetted?

147 Id. (describing termination that occured when an a young intern told his supervisor that he
was unavaialbe due to a family emergency, but co-workers later discovered pictures on Facebook
showing the intern attending a Halloween party dressed as a fairy).
148 See John R. Grasso & Brandon Fontaine, Criminal Consequences of Sending False
Information on Social Media, R.I. B.J., NOV.–DEC. 2011, at 5 (discussing the general unreliability of
social media and the potential consequences of using it to publish false information).
149 Ashley Kasarjian, The Social Media Checklist for Companies: What Your Clients Should
Do, Know and Learn, ARIZ. ATT‘Y, Mar. 2013, at 16, 20.
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2. The Issue of Consent and Allowable Trajectory of Cyber-vetting
The following questions should address the issue of cyber-vetting without
consent discussed earlier: Is consent required? What are the requirements for
personnel conducting Internet searches? What personal information will be used to
facilitate a complete and accurate cyber investigation? Is consent required for
searching specific social media profiles? Should consent be required from every
individual whose profile may become exposed in such searches?
3. The Appropriate Methodology
What are appropriate cyber-vetting methods? How will the cyber-vetting results
be authenticated? How should decision makers adjudicate cyber-vetting results?
How will the cyber-vetting results be protected from unauthorized disclosure? What
recourse does an unsuccessful applicant have in challenging the cyber-vetting
results?
To immunize itself from legal liabilities arising out of exposure to privileged or
protected class related information, an employer may explore all areas identified
above in detail. If an employer’s current procedures are not compatible with the
framework presented above, the employer must address the gaps and attempt to
close the gaps or discontinue cyber-vetting until a robust framework can be
implemented.
CONCLUSION
Contemporary society is confronted with a new paradox. In the limitless
possibilities of the hyper-technological era, pervasive digital immersion of individuals
has created a struggle between social norms and fundamental rights. The ease,
access, and sophistication of technology have developed a newer mode of social media
driven communication. Yet, exuberance in social media has resulted in a spectacular
degradation of privacy. This is manifested in technology-fuelled surveillance delving
deeper into an individual’s private space, in the name of identifying the most suitable
behavioral profile for a particular position. Thus, the fundamental right to privacy
has been subsumed into the right to seek meaningful employment.
Individual privacy rights are under violent assault from ever expanding
corporate rights. In the absence of robust laws supervising the scope and context of
employer behavior in cyber-vetting, retaining individual privacy has become
increasingly difficult in recent years. Because employers have an unprecedented
arsenal of surveillance mechanisms with which to search the digital footprints
individuals leave behind in cyberspace without sufficient legal protections to
constrain such surveillance, the time is ripe for a new direction in employment law
related to social media usage. This article is an effort in that direction. To evaluate
the allowable contour of cyber-vetting, therefore, this work engages in a fundamental
analysis of the linkage between individual behavior in social media and the
expectation of privacy at the workplace and in an analysis of how employment law
should address the growing disconnect in this area. The following observations
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should formulate a robust trajectory of employer behavior related to the scope,
context, and perimeter of searching an individual’s online activities.
First, an employer should recognize that digital immersion with social media
exuberance has given rise to pervasive online communication with strangers in
cyberspace. In this context, there should be clear delineation between an applicantemployee relationship and an employee-employer relationship. Thus, when the
privacy interest is transferred into an applicant-employee relationship, individual’s
behavioral profile in social media must not be conflated with the expected behavior
as an employee within a professional setting. Conflation can result in flawed
inferences, exposing the employer to a slew of legal liabilities.
Second, the scope of an employer’s surveillance must be balanced with the
targeted applicant’s subjective expectation of privacy for which constitutional
jurisprudence should provide the guiding principle. Revisiting Justice Harlan’s twoprong test of privacy, this article contextualizes individual privacy as a function of
society’s technologically mediated behavior. Thus, the legality of an employer’s
surveillance should be analyzed as a function of both the employer’s legitimate
business interest and the affected applicant’s expectation of privacy, as measured
through the lens of the broader societal expectation.
Third, seamless communication across multiple platforms with multiple
individuals with superior access and speed has lowered the threshold of individual
privacy. However, individuals retain the ability to determine themselves how much
information about them will be available on social media. This in turn must shape
an individual’s expectation of privacy in society, which can be used as an objective
indicium of an individual’s expectation of workplace privacy. Employer surveillance
must not be able to jeopardize such an expectation. Yet, such an expectation must be
objectively indexed based on the new reality of an über-connected social landscape.
Finally, driven by social media exuberance, an emerging behavioral norm is
taking root within contemporary society. This norm must be recognized as a driver
for shrinking contours of individual privacy. Employer surveillance must take due
precaution in not shrinking individual privacy further. Destruction of an individual’s
right to privacy might aid in compromising an applicant’s right of equity and antidiscrimination, which might invite sanctions and legal liabilities against the
employer.

